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purpose is to demonstrate the working of moral principles in human history (Gray, 180), the criticism
remains valid, and the problems created for serious historical investigation of the period cannot be
simply brushed aside and ignored.
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Unfortunately, the other sources, most notably Diodorus, provide very little independent information
about diplomacy. Only the short fragment of the Oxyrhynchus historian contains serious diplomatic
analysis (see 8.2 above), which is all the more valuable because it contrasts sharply with and thus
highlights vividly the other sources' comparative lack of interest in or disregard for the details of
diplomacy.
Despite these serious problems and the difficulties they create for reconstructing the diplomacy of
the early fourth century, it would be wrong to accept Plato's despairing characterization of
international life universal hostility subject to no rules as a permanent condition. The guaranteed
right of neutrality included in the first Common Peace of 371 was neither an unprecedented diplomatic
mirage nor an intentional sham. Currents of support for the recognition of and respect for abstaining
parties can be detected throughout these years. Far from giving up in Platonic despair, a number of
states continued to pursue alternative postures to the strict dichotomy of friends or enemies. It was
indeed a difficult period, but it was not devoid of successful neutral policy and ended with the issue of
abstention from interstate conflict squarely at the center of diplomatic reality.
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Chapter Nine
From the Battle at Leuctra to the Victory of Philip II at Chaeronea (371-338)
The Spartan defeat at Leuctra brought the question of neutrality to the forefront of interstate politics.
From the moment that the true extent of Sparta's losses became known, a new order of interstate
allegiances began to emerge in which neutrality was a more frequently sought-after option, despite
vigorous efforts by the leading states to suppress it. Between 371 and 338 there is a sharp increase in
the number of states withdrawing from alliances and refusing to participate further in the continued
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warfare between the hegemonial states.
I. The Second Common Peace of 371 and Its Aftermath
As expected, Athens took advantage of the neutrality clause in the Common Peace of 371 and held
aloof during the Spartan invasion of Boeotia, which ended in a disastrous defeat at Leuctra. But the
unexpected Theban victory caused an immediate change in Athenian policy. Neutrality was abandoned
and, in a stunning reversal of diplomatic principle, the newly recognized right of neutrality was
specifically repealed from the terms of a revised Common Peace sworn soon after the battle.[1] With
the exception of Elis, the states present accepted the following oath: "I will abide by the
[1] Xen. Hell . 6. 5.1; Bengtson, SVA no. 270. On the absence of the Thebans and Jason, see Ryder,
Koine Eirene, 131-33; Buckler, Theban Hegemony , 68.
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terms of peace that the king sent down and the decrees of the Athenians and their allies; and if
anyone marches against any city of those having sworn this oath, I will bring aid with all my strength "
(my italics).[2] Here then, within a few months of swearing a Common Peace at Sparta (i.e., the first
Common Peace of 371) that expressly freed the participating states from any obligation to aid one
another if the peace were violated, virtually all of the same states accepted a new treaty whose oath
explicitly precluded the right to remain neutral. But why? Why did the participating states reverse the
landmark position they had adopted just a short time before?
Recent explanations of the reversal have differed more in emphasis than in concept. Ryder, for
example, calls the repeal of the right of neutrality a "natural development" from an optional to a
compulsory guarantee of peace, in which the participants committed themselves to be the guarantors
but did not consider this commitment to be in any sense the formation of an alliance (symmachia )
between signatories. In his view, the reason for the prohibition was that the Peloponnesian states
needed security and the Athenians hoped to exact concessions from Sparta that would win prestige for
their own state and at the same time strengthen the Peloponnesian alliance's ability to withstand an
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